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Miami Dolphins

Football Operation Strategies the Dolphins Can Borrow from New England

Travis Wingfield



Three Patriots fundamentals Miami can adopt as it’s own

Though often imitated, the Patriot Way has not yet been duplicated. For Brian Flores to find success in Miami he’ll have to forge his own path and develop his own voice.

But just as any artist can draw inspiration from the work of his or her peers, the new head-honcho in Miami would be wise to borrow some of the strategic principles of his former boss, Bill Belichick.

Of the now seven assistants to defect from New England for NFL Head Coaching jobs under Belichick, Flores is the first to pluck fellow Patriot staffers. Not one, not two, but three members of the 2018 New England Patriots will join Flores in the pilgrimage to Miami. Flores, Chad O’Shea, Jerry Schuplinski, and Josh Boyer seek to elevate a franchise that has been mired in mediocrity to the same championship level of the organization from which each just departed.

Feb 3, 2019; Atlanta, GA, USA; New England Patriots wide receivers coach Chad O’Shea before Super Bowl LIII against the Los Angeles Rams at Mercedes-Benz Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Mark J. Rebilas-USA TODAY Sports

Beyond the coaching staff, Foxboro-South stands impact the roster as well. Between impending free agents Trey Flowers, Malcolm Brown, John Simon, Danny Shelton, Eric Rowe,and LaAdrian Waddle, and the outside chance that a star like Dont’a Hightower becomes a cap casualty, it’s conceivable that the pillaging has only just begun.

Extracting Patriots coaches and players to implement and execute similar offensive and defensive schemes is a given, but the copycat-act could extend into football operation strategies.

Simple strategies such as greater use of dime and nickel packages on defense. Packages that render the need for more members of the secondary.

The practical, although difficult, manipulation of the draft board placing greater value on the quantity of draft picks over the quality – more swings of the bat.

Last, and far-and-away the most challenging of the three, gaming the system to assure the accumulation of compensatory picks.

Tom Brady certainly helps, but it’s the forward thinking, attention to detail, and discovering unique approaches to the current NFL system that has forged the greatest dynasty professional football will ever know. For the Dolphins it’s baby steps. Starting with division titles or perhaps consecutive playoff appearances for the first time in two decades, emulating these three practices would nudge this once proud franchise back towards respectability.

Dime and Quarter Defensive Packages

In addition to playing man-coverage more than any defense in the NFL (54% of the time), few stop-units employed dime and quarter packages more than Brian Flores in 2018. From Kevin Dern’s Defensive Scheme piece, via Chris Kouffman, the Patriots multiple defense featured the use of defensive backs with great frequency. Of New England’s 1,014 defensive snaps in 2018, 335 featured six defensive backs on the field – 33% of the time (8.8% of those included seven defensive backs and there was one singular instance where eight DBs made it onto the field).

Xavien Howard is an elite lockdown cornerback.

Bobby McCain is an above average slot cornerback.

Minkah Fitzpatrick operates as a hybrid player roaming all over the field covering eight positions – much in the mold of Devin McCourty.

Reshad Jones is a box safety with limited range and coverage skills.

Beyond those four names, what do the Dolphins have in the defensive backfield cupboard? T.J. McDonald’s lack of footspeed is far too detrimental to operate in this new scheme.

Jalen Davis displayed flashes as an undrafted rookie. Cornell Armstrong’s rookie season was spent primarily on special teams.

Cordrea Tankersley finished his woeful sophomore campaign on injured reserve with a torn ACL and Torry McTyer had a rather forgettable 2018 season.

New England’s 2018 personnel usage included seven DBs playing 30% or more of the defense’s snaps. Six of those players eclipsed 49% – half of the defense’s total snaps.

*Far right column denotes percentage of Patriots’ defensive snaps played.

By comparison, Miami’s defensive back deployment in 2018 under Matt Burke was a far cry from New England’s modernized model.

*Far right column denotes percentage of Dolphins’ defensive snaps played.

Only five Dolphins DBs eclipsed that 30% threshold. What does all of this mean? Big changes are coming.

Miami needs at least three more competent defensive backs on the roster. That could come from development and growth of the aforementioned untested names, but it likely needs to feature new blood – probably high in April’s Draft.

Manipulating the Draft Board

A popular complaint when suggesting Miami’s need for secondary parts are the vast needs across the rest of the roster. With only the mandated seven draft picks at Miami’s disposal, another operation from the “Patriot Way” could join the migration south.

Jan 21, 2018; Foxborough, MA, USA; New England Patriots linebackers coach Brian Flores against the Jacksonville Jaguars during the AFC Championship at Gillette Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Mark J. Rebilas-USA TODAY Sports

Of New England’s nine draft picks in 2018, eight selections were made as a result of a trade. This is not a new practice for the NFL’s Evil Empire. In 2017 the Pats executed nine draft day trades besting 2016’s four trades.

You see, everything the Patriots do is based in analytics and research. The talking heads on television, Twitter scouts, even NFL executives – each will lament the difficulties of hitting on draft picks. A crap shoot, of sorts. A proverbial 50/50 shot in the draft, at best.

If each pick is equally destined to fail as they are to succeed, why not afford yourself more swings of the bat? Baseball is ruled by analytics. The advanced metrics say that each position a player moves down in the batting order will, over the course of a season, cost said player 30 plate appearances.

Mike Trout is the most dangerous man in the world with a bat in his hand. Traditionally, the greats are slotted to bat in the third-position in the order. Trout bats second, however, increasing the plate appearances he will see in a season.

What the Patriots do on draft weekend is no different. Instead of spending the high pick on a blue chip prospect, New England will move back, acquire picks, and select two players they deem fits for the scheme and issues a training camp competition.

This practice extends beyond the draft as New England has recently turned Malcolm Butler and J.C. Jackson into integral parts of a defense – both undrafted free agents.

Focusing on the Compensatory Pick Process

The other oddity of New England’s draft day antics is the number of compensatory picks awarded each year.

In 2016 four of the Pats’ nine draft picks were compensatory selections. A year later New England only received one comp pick and the 2018 season didn’t bring back any due to the 2017 signing of shutdown corner Stephone Gilmore.

But now, in 2019, New England landed a pair of third-round comp picks, a sixth-rounder and a seventh-rounder.

This formula is easier to navigate and the system is easier to game when Tom Brady is sitting perched atop the roster. There are two practices that contribute to New England’s constant hand in the cookie jar when it comes to compiling extra draft choices.

1.) Balking on big contract extensions for their own, homegrown talent – The beauty of an impenetrable scheme is the inflation of statistics for marginal players. Danny Amendola’s name is synonymous with success and production largely because of his time in New England. Rather than paying him at a level commensurate with that production, the Pats allowed him to walk and scooped up a draft pick as a result, without missing a beat in the wide receiver’s room.

2.) Signing players that were cut rather than contractually expired – The formula for comp picks can be exploited by avoiding the market of players whose contracts expired, and rather focusing on talent that was cut from a non-expiring contract. New England snatched Jason McCourty off the open market after the Browns cut the cornerback. New England played McCourty on 80% of their defensive snaps – quality production without disrupting the comp formula.

Perhaps most admirable of the Patriots many little schemes and devises to get an edge is the fluidity of their own program. These core principles are commonly adhered to, but unique circumstances allow Belichick and company to be amendable to their foundation.

So when Darrelle Revis becomes available, the Pats will spend the money and win a championship with “The Island” as the focal point of the defense.

Or when the Bills are foolish enough to let the game’s best cover corner (in 2018, at least) in Stephone Gilmore walk, the Pats go back to the Revis-like-well and win another championship on the back of a lockdown corner.

It’s important to reiterate that Brian Flores must establish his own identity in Miami if they are the chosen AFC East foe to dethrone the Pats. At the same time, ignoring the lessons learned from 15 years in the Patriots revolutionary program would be disingenuous and an attempt at reinventing the wheel.

After all, this is a copycat league.




  1. PhanaticalOne

    February 25, 2019 at 10:35 am

    Ugh, not a big difference between 5 DB’s playing more than 50% of the time and 6 DB’s playing more than 50% of the time. You want to know the difference in the two teams: Tom Brady vs. Everyone else Miami has had for the last decade.

  2. corners

    February 26, 2019 at 2:34 pm

    Talking about Gilmore and Revis makes me think even more we would be dumb to trade X.Howard.

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Miami Dolphins

Miami Dolphins Sign Chris Reed

Jason Hrina



Image Credit: Mark J. Rebilas-USA TODAY Sports

Looks like the Miami Dolphins have begun replacing the plethora of offensive linemen they either released or let walk this past offseason.

According to the Dolphins official social media account, the team signed offensive guard Chris Reed.

Details of the contract are currently unknown, but with the losses of Ja’Wuan James, Ted Larsen, Josh Sitton and possibly even players like Jake Brendel and Travis Swanson, the Dolphins need bodies to fill out their roster.

After signing with the Jacksonville Jaguars as an undrafted free agent out of the 2015 NFL draft, Reed was placed on the team’s practice squad and wasn’t activated until September, 2016. Over the past three seasons, Reed has been active for 25 games and started 8 of them.

You can’t expect too much from this signing, as Reed is simply expected to compete for depth on the offensive line and it’s possible he doesn’t even make the team out of training camp. Then again, Ted Larsen was originally supposed to be offensive line depth and he ended up playing 1,272 snaps over the course of his two-year Dolphins career.

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Miami Dolphins

Rebuilding Previous Rebuilds

Jason Hrina



Image Credit: Steve Mitchell-USA TODAY Sports

Now that we have accepted the notion that the Miami Dolphins are going to start rebuilding their franchise in 2019 (and as a result, a lot of losing will incur), we have moved on to the optimistic hope that this team is going to build their foundation “right”.

Hope is about the only thing that will temper the frustration that comes with going 6-10 with freshly signed Ryan Fitzpatrick as our starting quarterback, so over the next calendar year, you’re going to hear how most decisions are geared towards 2020.

Sure, Fitzpatrick will dazzle us with a couple 400-yard passing games and a few offensive performances that trick us into believing that we don’t need to desperately grab a franchise quarterback, but don’t let those extremely inconsistent anomalies fool you. Miami most definitely needs a franchise quarterback – one that leaves us with minimal doubts at the top of the draft.

Are they going to trade up for one in 2019? Or are they going to, um, conveniently lose in 2019 and attempt to save their assets for 2020, where there’s a chance that four starting-caliber quarterbacks come out of college – all of whom are possibly better than the top-2 quarterbacks in this class: Dwayne Haskins and Kyler Murray?

As Travis echoed on Sunday, the Miami Dolphins are building a treasure trove of draft picks that will allow themselves to navigate the murkiest of trade waters in either 2019 or 2020. With the trade of Ryan Tannehill to the Tennessee Titans netting Miami an extra 4th-round draft pick – along with the assumption that losing Ja’Wuan James to the Denver Broncos will return an extra 3rd-round pick as a compensatory selection – Miami will have the ability to tack on whichever mid-round picks are required to seal the deal for a top-3 draft pick.

But with all of these assets in mind, can we confidently assume that the Dolphins are just one year away from being a relevant franchise that can sustain success? No, not one bit.

Since Chris Grier took over as the Director of College Scouting in 2007, Miami has had 5 drafts in which they have had at least 9 draft picks to work with. Although it’s obvious that not every draft pick is going to pan out, the assumption is that a team should be able to identify enough cheap labor to fill their roster. You don’t need superstars in every round, though it would be nice if the Dolphins drafted even one of them.

Before you get ready to soak in the success of 2020, I’m going to remind you of the somber past we have together. Hopefully, Grier doesn’t allow history to repeat itself:


Chris Grier’s first year on the job yielded Miami with multiple draft steals, but came with an ample amount of draft busts as well.

Whether the selection was general manager Randy Mueller‘s, head coach Cam Cameron‘s, Grier’s, or a combination of the three, the Miami Dolphins shocked everyone by selecting Ted Ginn Jr with the 9th-overall pick in the draft.

Choosing Ted Ginn Jr over Brady Quinn proved to be the correct choice, but was Ginn really the player you wanted to commit a top-10 pick to? Especially when he was coming off of an injury and was seen more as a dynamic kick returner than an elite, #1 receiver?

Here are a few players taken shortly after Ginn was picked #9: Patrick Willis (11), Marshawn Lynch (12) and Darrelle Revis (14). I was going to include Lawrence Timmons (15th-overall), but I don’t think Miami fans are going to think too fondly of that linebacker (though let’s be honest, he was still a better pick than Ginn).

But the Miami Dolphins had 10 draft picks in 2007, and should have been able to build a team with more than just a failed 1st-round pick, right? Alas, this is what they graced us with that year:

Paul Soliai in the 4th-round and Brandon Fields in the 7th-round ended up being phenomenal choices for the Dolphins, as both players combined to play 227 games with Miami. Even Samson Satele was a good selection in the 2nd-round; Miami just doesn’t understand their own talent and allowed Satele to be a good starting center for two other teams instead of their own.

The rest of that draft class? Combined to be active for 32 games with the Dolphins. All of which were off the team by the start of the 2008 season.


Coming off of a 1-15 season that felt less like a rebuild and more like a purgatory, the Dolphins were now poised to genuinely begin their ascension with the 1st-overall selection in the draft.

The thing is, Miami’s biggest mistake wasn’t selecting Jake Long with the #1 overall pick, but bringing an archaic Bill Parcells on board to build a team for the future.

Parcells figured there was no sense having a franchise quarterback if there was no one to protect him (the opposite logic of what the Dolphins did with Ryan Tannehill throughout his career), and selected Jake Long to protect whoever’s blindside.

You might be able to excuse Parcells for selecting a potential hall of fame left tackle (for the first four years of their career) over Matt Ryan, since Miami did have 8 more draft picks that year. Instead, this is how the draft shook out:

Kendall Langford was a solid player on the Dolphins defensive line throughout his rookie contract, but other than Jake Long he was the only player to plug a hole on the roster. You can say Chad Henne played prominently for the Dolphins, but we all know he was a detriment more than a solution, and even forced Miami to pick yet another quarterback in the 2nd-round the following draft.

Phillip Merling gave us that exciting interception against Brett Favre and the New York Jets the year Chad Pennington led the team to the playoffs, but other than that, he was basically an extra 1st-round pick that ended up being a complete bust.

After two years and 19 draft picks, the Dolphins should have set themselves up to be a young team worth reckoning with. Looking back, there were really only 5 players that filled a capable roster spot: Satele, Soliai, Fields, Long and Langford. For reference, NFL rosters held 52 players…


After two failed drafts and nearly 19 wasted draft picks, the Miami Dolphins actually got a draft right. This comes with the caveat that it’s the third-consecutive year in which the team is selecting a quarterback in the 2nd-round, so it tells you just how lost the Dolphins really are.

Pat White was a fascinating college athlete to watch, but he had no business being a quarterback in the NFL. The football community was stunned to see White selected so high, but the Dolphins envisioned a quarterback that could complete their wildcat offense and keep opposing defenses confused at all times.

The only confusion White caused was on Miami’s offense, because the playbook was extremely small for the limited quarterback, and the offense was stale at best.

Miami’s best selections came from Vontae Davis and Sean Smith. The team also envisioned having a pair of young, cheap, shutdown corners to give Tom Brady, Brett Favre and whoever the Buffalo Bills had hell. And they were really onto something for a little bit, but Joe Philbin‘s inability to handle egos mixed with some immaturity on the player’s side “forced” the Dolphins to trade Davis and allow Smith to leave in free agency.

At the time, this was a very good draft, but looking back at it, it’s just some more disappointment:

Brian Hartline received a contract extension with the team and probably outperformed all of our expectations. Maybe it speaks to the lack of playmakers the Dolphins have had over their history, but Hartline has the 7th most receiving yards and 9th most receptions in Dolphins history. We can knock the extension as a separate topic, but selecting Hartline in the 4th-round was a very good draft pick.

Chris Clemons ended up playing 80 games with the Dolphins and served as a valuable depth player for 5 seasons.

This can be deemed a good draft for the Dolphins, but the problem is, we’re excited the team was able to find 3 starters. While every team would love to say they found 3 starters in each draft, the Dolphins didn’t have much of a roster around those guys, which meant the team hadn’t rebuilt much of anything up to this point.

A budding franchise looking to sustain success is going to need more than a good #3 receiver to escape mediocrity.


2012 was another very good draft for the Dolphins that saw virtually no sustained success going forward. This is the point where you have to wonder if the Miami Dolphins legitimately try to win or if they’re fine creating media headlines and bringing in ad revenue.

Ryan Tannehill was the first 1st-round quarterback the Dolphins selected since Dan Marino back in 1983. Between all of the excitement and optimism, fans were sold on the fact that Tannehill was going to turn the team around (after he firmly learned the quarterback position). His old coach at Texas A&M, Mike Sherman, was set to be his offensive coordinator, so you know Miami was really building this thing right because, you know, “chemistry”.

7 seasons later, and there are no surviving members of the 2012 draft class. In fact, only one of them made it past year 4 (Tannehill) – which also happens to be the same number of players eventually arrested from this draft class (Jonathan Martin).

How can a team sustain success when the team doesn’t sustain any of their successful players?

Olivier Vernon and Lamar Miller proved to be great risks that Jeff Ireland took. Coming right out of the Dolphins backyard from the University of Miami, Vernon and Miller were underclassmen that Ireland saw potential in. And he was right.

Both outperformed their draft status and earned themselves wealthy contracts in free agency. This goes back to the argument that the Dolphins are incompetent when it comes to signing their own draft picks, so overall, this draft doesn’t seem like much, but this draft could have been much more than a free agent payday for 3 of their selections.

Rishard Matthews was one of the best 7th-round picks in Dolphins history, but Philbin’s deadpan personality placed Matthews on the bench for most of his rookie contract rather than the starting lineup ahead of players like B.J. Cunningham and Legedu Naanee.

As of 2019, the Dolphins are still looking for a player at every position from the list of 2012 draft picks (QB, RT, DE, TE, LB, WR and DT). You can say Miami doesn’t need a running back, but that’s also the easiest position to find and it’s not even like the team currently has a solidified running back room anyway.


Identifying a “can’t-miss” athlete in an inactive market, Jeff Ireland made one of the best draft-day trades of the century and traded the team’s 1st-round pick (12th-overall) and 2nd-round pick (42nd-overall) to move up to #3 overall. That kind of trade would be unheard of today, where those top picks are commodities that you have to pry away with current and future draft capital.

So what did the Dolphins do with their robbery? Select a stellar athlete with a history of demons that rivals that of Josh Gordon.

Dion Jordan was built to be a football player, but he never actually wanted to be a football player. He wanted to escape reality and realized this was a profession he was good at. Fortunately for Jordan, but unfortunately for the Dolphins, Jordan took 5 years to mature past all of those inner turmoils and emerge as a defensive threat.

But like the theme of this article, his success doesn’t benefit the Miami Dolphins one bit.

Dion Jordan wasn’t the only player to fail Miami’s expectations yet perform better elsewhere.

2nd-round pick Jamar Taylor was always hampered by injuries and was shipped to the Cleveland Browns for a 27 slot draft boost in the 7th-round (a farcry from #54 overall). Dion Sims was a solid backup and blocking tight end before cashing in with the Chicago Bears. Mike Gillislee was a decent kick returner who has seen a good amount of success as a running back with the Buffalo Bills and New England Patriots. Even Caleb Sturgis was viewed as a “bust” and has since played 36 games for other teams.

You could argue that Don Jones was Miami’s best draft pick behind Dion Sims that year, and that’s only because he was a very good gunner on special teams.

Truth is, the Dolphins have had plenty of opportunities to rebuild and yet, years later, here we are, still trying to rebuild. So now that Chris Grier has ultimate control, will this be the rebuild the Dolphins finally turn it around? 6th time’s a charm, right?

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Miami Dolphins

Free Agent Analysis: Quarterback Ryan Fitzpatrick

Travis Wingfield



Buckle up, Phins Fans – the Fitzmagic Roller Coaster is coming to your town

Ryan Fitzpatrick is on his eight NFL team following a circuitous route that spans 14 seasons as a professional football player. The journeyman stopgap heads to America’s retirement home on a two-year contract that starts at $11 million and could escalate to $20 million if unspecified incentives are met.

Though details of the contract’s structure are not yet available, it’s a near certainty that the bulk of the money will be paid out in year-one. With the Dolphins eating a chunk of dead cap, and pushing assets down the road, this move not only helps Miami get closer to the salary floor, it secures a sturdy backup quarterback for the 2020 season.

Whether it’s Kyler Murray, Dwayne Haskins, Tua Tagovailoa, Jake Fromm or any other quarterback prospect, Fitzpatrick has been heralded for his calm demeanor and approach to providing this very important element to his past teams.

Barring a trade-up for one of the top two prospects in this draft Fitzpatrick will be under-center when the Dolphins open the season on the second Sunday in September. Only one September ago, Fitzpatrick was on an unprecedented roll for a quarterback of his caliber – of any caliber, really.

After the three-game stretch of consecutive 400 yard outputs, Fitzpatrick throttled into a nosedive throwing for less than 250 yards in four of his next five starts. Cumulatively, his passer rating on the season was 100.4, but he failed to eclipse the 90.0 mark in all but one of his final six starts.

The strengths and weaknesses of Fitzpatrick’s game are abundantly clear. Where the flashes with Ryan Tannehill provided false hope, Fitzpatrick is an open book – it only takes a couple of games of all-22 to figure out exactly who he is.

First, the strengths. I’ve talked at length about the importance of a backup quarterback providing the locker room and huddle with a sense of comradery. Whether it’s this season or next, Fitzpatrick will eventually be relegated to the number-two QB. The Ewing Theory suggests that the rest of the roster can elevate its game when the backup enters the lineup, but that typically only applies when said backup is likable.

That clip also showcases the gamer-mentality of Fitzpatrick. With reckless abandon, he’ll take a hit for his team in a way you’d never want your franchise quarterback to play.

As for Fitzpatrick the starter, the strength of his game is also his biggest weakness. He trusts his eyes as much as any quarterback going right now and will let ‘er rip without hesitation. There’s a hint of Matt Moore in his game where he evaluates pre-snap and makes quick decisions based on the leverage of the defense.

The first touchdown of the season for Tampa Bay provides a terrific example of Fitzpatrick’s ability to move the defense with his eyes and hips. The clip also showcases his strength as a play-action passer when given a comfortable pocket.

There’s a reason he’s been on eight teams in 14 years, however. That anticipation, coupled with sloppy mechanics, gets him into a lot of hot water. If the defense is at all nuanced, and capable of disguising coverage, he’s going to turn the ball over a heck of a lot.

Randomly, the ball will sail as he is prone to rushing his setup and spraying bullets all over the field. Pressure in his face only amplifies this shortcoming.

All things told, this was the best veteran option available both in terms of playing time and veteran mentor to the inevitable draft pick coming in a year or two. There will be equal parts excitement and sheer frustration with Fitzpatrick playing in Miami.

As far as the Tank for Tua conversation, this signing likely solidifies that Miami will not be the worst team in football. I’ve argued that they would never reach those valleys to begin, even with a rookie or Luke Falk under-center. I believe too strongly in Brian Flores and the staff he has assembled for this team to lose a number of games in the teens. Fitzpatrick at least gets Miami out of the massive hole of unworthy NFL quarterback territory.

Ideally, the Dolphins find their quarterback straight away and never have to start Fitzpatrick. The more likely outcome is that he starts the season and puts the Dolphins in a tough spot regarding the playing time incentives in his contract.

This signing is great from a financial standpoint right now, but if the Harvard product (had to get it in) starts hitting those contract escalators, that would not be ideal.


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